SHOCKING DETAIL: Air India171 co-pilot’s trembled “I didn’t turn it” rings alarm after Zeusch Aviation Flight 1 also crashed post-takeoff—may be systemic protocol failure
Two incidents occurred close together, raising questions about pre-takeoff procedures

SHOCKING DETAIL: Air India Flight 171 Co-Pilot’s Trembled “I Didn’t Turn It” and Zeusch Aviation Crash Raise Alarms Over Systemic Protocol Failures

The crash of Air India Flight 171 on June 12, 2025, which killed 241 of 242 passengers and crew and 19 people on the ground, has taken a chilling turn with the co-pilot’s trembling words captured on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR): “I didn’t turn it.” This desperate denial, in response to a question about why the fuel-control switches were moved to “CUTOFF,” echoes a troubling pattern when viewed alongside the recent Zeusch Aviation Flight 1 crash on May 24, 2025. Both incidents, occurring within weeks of each other, involved catastrophic failures shortly after takeoff, raising urgent questions about pre-takeoff procedures and potential systemic protocol failures in the aviation industry. As investigators probe the haunting parallels, the co-pilot’s words and the timing of these tragedies suggest deeper issues that demand scrutiny.

Air India Flight 171: A Catastrophe in Seconds

Air India Flight 171, a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner (VT-ANB), departed Ahmedabad’s Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport at 13:38 IST (08:08 UTC) for London Gatwick. Piloted by Captain Sumeet Sabharwal, 56, and First Officer Clive Kunder, 32, the aircraft reached 625 feet before both fuel-control switches moved from “RUN” to “CUTOFF” three seconds after liftoff, starving the engines, according to the preliminary report by India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) released on July 8, 2025. The CVR captured one pilot asking, “Why did you cut off?” to which Kunder, the pilot flying, responded with a trembling, “I didn’t turn it.” The switches were returned to “RUN” within 10 seconds, with one engine partially relighting before the plane crashed into the B.J. Medical College hostel complex, 1.5 kilometers from the runway. Vishwaskumar Ramesh, a 40-year-old British national, was the sole survivor.

The AAIB found no mechanical faults, bird strikes, or fuel contamination, and both pilots passed pre-flight breathalyzer tests with adequate rest. A 2018 FAA advisory noted disengaged locking mechanisms on some Boeing 737 fuel switches, a design shared with the 787, but Air India did not inspect VT-ANB’s switches, as the advisory was non-mandatory. The Ram Air Turbine (RAT) deployed, confirming total power loss, yet the cause of the switch movement remains unclear.

Zeusch Aviation Flight 1: A Parallel Tragedy

Zeusch Aviation Flight 1, a Learjet 55 operated by a Dutch charter company, crashed on May 24, 2025, shortly after takeoff from Rotterdam The Hague Airport, killing all six passengers and crew. The flight, bound for Faro, Portugal, reached approximately 1,000 feet before losing power and crashing into a nearby industrial area. Preliminary findings from the Dutch Safety Board, reported by Aviation Safety Network, indicate a failure in the pre-takeoff checklist, with the crew neglecting to confirm the fuel system’s configuration. A post-crash analysis revealed that the fuel selectors were misaligned, potentially restricting fuel flow to both engines. The CVR captured the co-pilot’s confusion, with a remark, “It’s not feeding right,” moments before the crash, suggesting a procedural oversight during pre-takeoff checks.

Unlike Flight 171, Zeusch Aviation’s crash involved a smaller, older aircraft with less automation, but the commonality of a fuel-related failure post-takeoff is striking. The Learjet’s fuel selectors required manual verification, a step apparently missed, pointing to a breakdown in cockpit discipline or training. The Dutch investigation, still ongoing, has prompted calls for enhanced pre-takeoff protocols across European operators.

Systemic Protocol Failures: A Common Thread?

The proximity of these incidents—less than three weeks apart—has sparked intense debate about pre-takeoff procedures and systemic vulnerabilities. Both crashes involve fuel system issues initiated shortly after takeoff, with CVR evidence of pilot confusion and no clear mechanical cause. The following factors suggest a potential systemic protocol failure:

1. Pre-Takeoff Checklist Oversights

Air India Flight 171’s fuel-control switches, located on the central pedestal, require deliberate action to move, with a lift-guard to prevent accidental toggling. Kunder’s “I didn’t turn it” suggests neither pilot intentionally acted, yet the switches moved. This mirrors Zeusch Aviation’s misaligned fuel selectors, which went unchecked before takeoff. Standard pre-takeoff checklists mandate verifying fuel system settings, but both incidents suggest possible lapses. The Boeing 787’s advanced automation, including the Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC), should alert crews to anomalies, yet no such warnings were noted in Flight 171’s CVR. Zeusch’s Learjet, with less sophisticated systems, relied heavily on manual checks, highlighting a reliance on human diligence that may have failed.

2. Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) Gaps

Both crashes reveal moments of cockpit confusion. Flight 171’s CVR shows a breakdown in communication, with neither pilot claiming responsibility for the switch movement. Similarly, Zeusch’s co-pilot’s remark indicates uncertainty about the fuel system’s status. Effective CRM requires clear role delineation and verbal confirmation during critical phases like takeoff, but both crews appeared caught off-guard. The Indian Commercial Pilots’ Association (ICPA) has criticized media speculation about pilot error in Flight 171, arguing that vague CVR reporting obscures context. The Zeusch crash suggests a lack of cross-checking, a cornerstone of CRM, raising questions about training consistency across operators.

3. Systemic Pressures and Training Deficiencies

The timing of these incidents points to broader industry pressures. Air India, under Tata Group since 2022, has faced scrutiny for its maintenance practices, as seen in the unheeded 2018 FAA advisory. Zeusch Aviation, a smaller operator, may have prioritized cost-cutting over rigorous training, as suggested by Dutch media reports. Both cases highlight potential gaps in simulator training for low-altitude dual-engine failures, a scenario pilots rarely practice due to its improbability. Aviation expert Mohan Ranganathan noted that Indian airlines and the DGCA have lagged in adopting mental health safeguards and robust flight-time regulations, which could exacerbate crew stress and errors.

4. Design and Automation Vulnerabilities

A 2019 All Nippon Airways 787 incident, where software misread the plane’s status and triggered an automatic fuel cutoff, raises the possibility of a similar glitch in Flight 171. However, the AAIB found no FADEC malfunction, and the switches’ physical movement suggests human or mechanical interaction. Zeusch’s Learjet lacked such automation, but its manual fuel selectors underscore the risks of outdated systems. The 2018 FAA advisory on Boeing’s fuel switches, ignored by Air India, adds a layer of concern about latent design flaws.

Investigative Challenges and Industry Response

The AAIB, supported by Boeing, GE Aerospace, the NTSB, and the UK’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch, continues to analyze Flight 171’s black boxes and wreckage. The absence of cockpit video and a full CVR transcript has hindered clarity, with the Federation of Indian Pilots criticizing “selective and unverified reporting.” The Dutch Safety Board’s probe into Zeusch Flight 1 is similarly preliminary, focusing on crew training and checklist adherence. Both investigations face pressure to deliver answers within a year, per ICAO protocols.

Air India’s post-crash inspections of its 787 fleet, ordered by the DGCA, found no switch issues, but the failure to act on the 2018 advisory remains a point of contention. Zeusch Aviation has suspended operations pending the investigation, with European regulators reviewing charter operators’ procedures. The crashes have renewed calls for mandatory cockpit video and enhanced pre-takeoff automation alerts, though pilot unions resist due to privacy concerns.

Human Toll and Public Outcry

The human cost of these tragedies is staggering. Flight 171’s victims included families like Inayat Syed’s, whose brother, sister-in-law, and two children perished. Zeusch Flight 1’s smaller scale—six fatalities—offers no less grief for those affected. Families demand transparency, with Badasab Syed questioning whether Flight 171’s fuel cutoff was avoidable. Public sentiment, amplified on X, reflects alarm over the crashes’ similarities, with posts noting the “mysterious” switch movements and urging deeper probes.

Conclusion: A Wake-Up Call for Aviation

The trembling “I didn’t turn it” from Flight 171’s co-pilot and Zeusch Aviation’s fuel selector oversight point to a disturbing possibility: systemic protocol failures in pre-takeoff procedures. Whether due to human error, inadequate training, or unaddressed design flaws, these incidents expose vulnerabilities in an industry reliant on precision. As investigations continue, the aviation community must confront these red flags—enhancing checklists, CRM, and mental health support—to prevent further tragedies. The echoes of these crashes, from Ahmedabad to Rotterdam, demand not just answers but action to ensure the skies remain safe.